Associated Industrial Developments, Inc., A California Corporation v. J. Paul Jewkes And Lorna Jewkes, Husband And Wife : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983
Associated Industrial Developments, Inc., A
California Corporation v. J. Paul Jewkes And Lorna
Jewkes, Husband And Wife : Brief of Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.H. Hal Visick; Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Associated Industrial Developments v. Jewkes, No. 19374 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4233
IN fHE SUPRE\1E COURT 
0 F THE 
SfATE OF UTAH 
\SSO\ T\ TEil IN llUSTRIAL DEYELOP\1ENT'S, 
IN<'., ·\ <'al1forn111 t'orporat1on, 
J. PAL'L JEWKES and LORSA JEWKES, 





BRIEP OF APPELL.AMT 
an Appeal from a Judgment or 
The Fourth Judicial District Court in and for U\all COWllJ 
Judge Allen B. Soren.en Praidl,. 
11.tl\L VISICK, ESQ. 
H""· (/u1nney, 11nd Nebeker 
'•: N. L"rnver.,1ty Ave. 
I'""""· l. I' ~460 I 
\ ttornev for Appell11nt 
DAVE MCMULLIN, l!IQ. 
P.O. Box 171 
Paywon, UT 14111 
A norney ror R•pond•l 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
0 F THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS, 
INC., A California Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
J. PAUL JEWKF.S and LORNA JEWKES, 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
an Appeal from a Judgment of 
The Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County 
Judge Allen B. Sorensen Presiding 
H.HAL VISICK, ESQ. 
Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker 
92 N. University Ave. 
Provo, UT 8460 I 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVE MCMULLIN, F.SQ. 
P.O. Box 176 
Payson, UT 84651 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. Unless Equitable Relief is Provided 
to Jewkes, Jewkes will Suffer Substantial 
Losses Resulting from Breaches by AID, and 
AID Will Experience an Undeserved Windfall. 
II. The Attorneys Fees Awarded in this Case 
Bear no Relation to the Value of Services 
Rendered, are Exorbitant and Unreasonable 











TABLE OF CITATIONS 
Ca_,;es Cited 
r ;o[dfarb v. Virginia State Bar 42 l US# 773 1973 
Jensen v. Lichtenstein 45, Utah 320, 145p 1036 
L,ucerne Inv. v. Estate of Belvedere Inc. 
411F. 2d 1205 (CA 1969) 
Perkins v. Spencer 243p 2d 1952 
Authorities 
5 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed, Sec. SU, 621 
57 ALR 3d, 475 Attorneys Fees in Absence of 
Provision pp. 485-487. 
58 AL R 3d, 20 l Attorneys Fees in Real Estate 
Matters pp. 2Cl 
.\merican Bar Association Discplinary Rule 2-106 
American Heritage Dictionary, 1969, pp. 821 
l'tah Code Sec 57-1-32 
l'tah Code Sec 57-1-23 
l' t~h \ode Sec 78-37-2 















STATE\!ENT OF THE NATL'RE OF THE CASE 
fh1s case is an Action for foreclosure of a Deed of 
l'r"'t 1Vi a mortgage, and a counteract ion for equ1 table 
rel 1cf based on delays in performance of the sellers 
coven11nts and additions in value to the property made by the 
<lPfend11nt chappellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE L<JrVER COURT 
Foreclosure was granted in the lower court. 
,\µpellant's request for equitable relief was denied. 
·\ttorneys fees in the amount of $26,577 were awarded. 
3. 
NATURE OF THE REL l EF SOUr,HT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests that this court order the co•irl 
below to enter an order granting equitable relief to 
appellants, based upon their substantial contributions 
the value of the property being foreclosed, and the fai 
of the appellees to perform their covenants with appeltae· 
promptly, and, in some eases, failure to perform them at 
all. Also, that this court reduce the attorney's fees 
awarded to a reasonable attorney's fee. 
4. 
--
STATEMENT OF FACfS 
l. On March 18, 1977, Cedar Hills Development Company 
(the predecessor in the interest of appellees), granted a 
~ont1nuing option to purchase land to Timpanogos Cove 
Development Corporation and others (appellants predecessors 
1n interest) to acquire certain 193-acre tract located north 
of the city of Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Transcript pages 52, 
53, and Trial Exhibit 1) 
2. On November 15, 1977, appellants (hereinafter 
referred to as "Jewkes") acquired the rights of the buyers 
under Exhibit 1 to purchase the land (Trial Exhibit 7). 
(See also Hold Harmless and Warranty stapled to Trial 
Exhibit 2) On November 15, 1977, the continuing option 
\Exhibit 1), was amended by the original parties. A copy of 
the amendment is set forth as Trial Exhibit 2. This 
amendment was approved by and transferred to appellants. 
3. Jewkes made several payments to appellees 
(hereinafter called AID) and to its predecessors in 
interest, all of which are set forth in Trial Exhibit 7. 
Jewkes received the various releases of property therein 
described, leaving a balance of approximately 80 acres, 
which is the subject of this action. 
5. 
4. On May 15, 1981, Jewkes and AID entered into lhe 
Extension of Option Agreement and Agreement set forth 81 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 at trial. This agreement spec 1 t 1e, 
that appellees would deed the property to Jewkes, taking 
back a note and Deed of Trust. (Exhibit 3 provides thai 
prior agreements, obligations, and understandings wouldD" 
"merged" into the deed and into the Trust Deed note and 
Trust Deed.) 
5. The Trust Deed note and Trust Deed, (Plaintiff•, 
Exhibits 4 and 5 at trial), were executed by parties, and 
al though undated, the Trust Deed shows a recording date o: 
Nov. 12, 1981. 
6. No more payments were made on the Deed of Trust. 
and the full balance of $265,777.81 was unpaid at the dttle 
of trial (transcript, page 10 ). The order of the court 
granting foreclosure states the amount of interest due on 
June 24, 1981 as $29,919.79 and continuing at the rateoi 
$50.97 per day. 
7. AID failed to provide water to the property, anc 
Jewkes did so by obtaining a well permit and drilling' 
well, at a cost of approximately $100,000. 
pages 60,87,88.) 
6. 
( t ranscr i ~t 
8. No sewer connections were provided to the property. 
Although Jewkes signed a waiver (Plaintiff's exhibit 6) of a 
claim for an extension of sewer and water mains to the 
property, he testified that it was his understanding that 
this covered only the physical cost of the lines themselves, 
and did not release AID from the obligation of providing 
water and sewer services to the property. (transcript, page 
8 5) 
9. The only testimony given at trial concerning the 
value of the property was by Jewkes, who testified that he 
had been involved in the appraisal, development, and 
ownership of property for a period of 34 years. Jewkes 
testified that the 80 acres had a present fair market value 
of $10,000 to $15,000 per acre. (transcript page 72) No 
contrary testimony was introduced by AID. Testimony is 
undisputed in this case that the value of the property is 
between $800,000 and $1,200,000. 
10. Jewkes performed all necessary labor and took all 
actions necessary (including contribution of his $100,000 
water well) to the city of Cedar Hills in order for the 
Annexation of the property to the city of Cedar Hills 
(transcript, page 88). 
7. 
II. AID failed to transfer to Jewkes a 1.8 Here p; 
containing the frontage of the property on Canyon Roao, 
compelled to do so by Jewkes after a period of 17 monlh,, 
thus denying Jewkes access to the property and delay 1 n~ 
planning. (transcript, pages 89 and 90) 
12. The delays set forth above, together with the 
delays set forth in defendants trial exhibit 7, preventec 
development of the property in a timely fashion, and 
resulted in the i nabi Ii ty to pay the mortgage on time. 
(transcript pages 90, 91, and 92) 
13. No testimony as to the number of hours spent bv 
counsel in this case was introduced. 
14. AID's expert testified that attorney's fees 100 
foreclosure action should be 10% of the amount due withoc· 
regard to the effort employed. (transcript, pages 36,371 
15. AID's president testified that he had agreed \j 
pay AID' s counsel 10% of the recovery. (transcript, p.4 8 
8. 
ARGUMENT 
1. UNLESS EQUITABLE RELIEF IS PROVIDED TO JEWKES, 
JEWKES WILL SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES RESULTING FROM 
BREACTfES BY AID, AND AID WILL EXPERIENCE AN UNDESERVED 
WINDFALL. 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law of the court below are erroneous. 
Paragraph 8 states that "the record does not show any 
specific periods of delay in the performance of Plaintiff's 
material duties under the contract between the parties which 
are claimed by the defendants." Exhibit 7, introduced at 
trial, details delays of from 3 to 17 months in the delivery 
of title to property under the agreement. No contrary 
evidence was introduced at trial by AID and, therefore, the 
existence of such delays is undisputed. 
Jewkes also testified that AID denied that it had sold 
to him the parcel of property which provided access from the 
existing highway to the property, and that this dispute was 
not resolved for 17 months after the date on which title to 
the property should have been delivered to him. (transcript, 
pages 89,90). No contrary evidence was introduced by 
Plaintiffs at trial. In the absence of contrary evidence, 
the court could not reasonably make the finding that the 
9 
record does not reveal delays in the performance of .\ii· 
mater i a 1 du t i es . The co u r t d i d not i n d i ca t e t hat 1 t 
believe the evidence introduced by Jewkes. 
In finding of fact 9, the court states "the co11r: 
that Plaintiff has substantially complied with the ter~11 
P 1 a i n t i f f ' s ex h i bi t l. " Th i s i s en t i re l y cont r a r y t 0 t ,·,, 
items mentioned in the paragraph above, and ignores the· 
that Jewkes had to furnish water and sewer to the proper'. 
which had been promised by AID, at an expense in excess,: 
$100,000. No contrary evidence was introduced at trial), 
AID. 
The cwnulative delays caused by AID's failure to 
deliver title and to provide water to the property arooun: 
years. The result is that Jewkes was prevented from 
developing the property during the favorable Real Estate 
market which existed at the time the property was 
purchased. Before marketing the property became poss1b: 0 
recession in the Real Estate business had occurred, 
(transcript, page 81) 
At trial, Jewkes, who has served as an Appraiser f•ir 
the County of Los Angeles, and has been in the Real Es'.a:' 
development and sale business for some 34 years, testtf 
that the value of the property was between $10,000 anr 
$15,000 per acre. No evidence as to value other than 
111
· 
was introduced at trial. The Court therefore was requ:c' 
either to find tha Jewkes was not qualified to testifY'' 
value, or, that the value of the property is between $10,000 
and $15,000 per acre, making the total value of the 80-acre 
parcel in question between $800,000 and $1,200,000. The 
mortgage obligation is approximately $265,000. Thus, it is 
clear that if no relief is granted to Jewkes, he will suffer 
substantial and irreparable harm. AID will also be allowed 
to escape from the consequences of its many breaches of its 
agreement with Jewkes. 
The Trial Court, in its conclusions of law, noted that 
the extension of option agreement (Exhibit 6) provided that 
the preceeding written agreements will be "merged" into the 
Deed of Trust. The Court concluded from this, that AID is 
excused from all of its breaches. 
The term "merger", however, is susceptible to numerous 
meanings, the most convnon of which is the dictionary 
definition "to blend together so as to lose identity." 
(American Heritage Dictionary, 1969, p.821) This implies 
th~t the term merger was intended to indicate that all of 
the agreements were joined and became one, rather than that 
some were nu 11 i fie d, as the court seems to i n t er pre t i t. 
In Williston on Contracts, 3rd edition, Sec. 811., the 
author discusses the effect of merger clauses in written 
contracts. He notes that the purpose of such merger clauses 
is to limit the ability of an agent to vary a standard 
written agreement by oral promises, and that it is an 
extension of the parole evidence rule. This, of course, has 
11 
no application to the present C'ase, since the preceed 1111 
agreements were written, and were not indended to sene 
variation against a printed final contract. 
The author notes that "a merger clause, for 1nstan··· 
does not prevent the application of the rules as to 
collateral agreements." At the very least, this prov 1, 1'°. 
has created an ambiguity, since the meaning is unclear a, 
what is intended by the word "merger". The conmon rule 
interpreting contracts is that an ambiguity must be 
interpreted against the party drafting the document. (se< 
e.g. Williston on Contracts, 3rd edition, Sec. 62.!_, ent:i.· 
"Language will be Interpreted most Strongly Against the 
Party Using it." 
It is therefore clear the covenants of the preced1ns 
agreements still apply. In addition to the failure to 
perform such covenents promptly, the fai Jure of AID to 
provide water and sewer to the property has caused 
substantial injury to Jewkes. In addition to these 11atlf" 
Jewkes has expended time and money for planning the 
property, and has, after much effort, successfully had 
property annexed to the city of Cedar Hi !ls, which add\ 
substantial value to the property. (transcript, pages:, 
7 4). 
Jewkes has paid to AID more than $600,000 and ha' 
. d b t . I I y to t r,e performed services which have adde su stan 1a 
12 
value of the property. Owing to the peculiarities of Utah 
Trust Deed Law, AID is in the position not only to foreclose 
the mortgage and retake the property, but bid substantially 
less than the fair market value of the property and seek a 
deficiency judgement. Utah Law does not require AID to 
stand behind its implied representation in the sale of 
property that it was worth the amount for which it was 
sold. Neither does present law compensate Jewkes for his 
substantial investment in the property and the greatly 
enhanced value which the property now has. 
Under Utah Trust Deed Law, (Utah Code Sec.57-1-32), any 
attempt to collect a deficiency judgement requires proof in 
court that the debtor has bid the full fair market value of 
the property at the sale. However, if the debtor elects to 
foreclose the Deed of Trust as a mortgage, as authorized by 
Utah Code Sec. 57-1-23, no requirement exists for the 
demonstration that the sale has been at fair market value. 
(Utah Code Sec. 78-37-2) This is obviously the reason why 
AID has proceeded to foreclose the Deed of Trust as a 
mortgage, rather than the far simpler and less expensive 
procedure of selling the property under the Power of Sale. 
Jewkes is being required not only to suffer the possibility 
of a deficiency judgement, but also, to pay greater costs 
and attorney's fees as a result of the election of AID to 
proceed in this fashion. 
13. 
Under the circumstances, it seems cle!lr that cqu 11 . 
should be available to prevent the substantial 1nius1 1, .. 
which appears to be occurring in this case. .Jewkes 1 , 
unaware of any case which is directly applicable to thr 
imposition of equitable standards for relief 1n arnor1. 5,,. 
foreclosure on a Deed of Trust. However, Jewkes di rec\, 
attention of the court to the case of Perkins vs. Spene.':..'._ 
243p,2d, 1952, in which this court refused to grant a 
forfeiture under a land sales contract where the rernain:n; 
balance to be paid was small with respect to the value o' 
the property, including the improvements made by the 
defendant. Similar relief could and should be fash1onea · 
this court to prevent Jewkes from being injured by AID 1n 
the fashion suggested in this case. 
While Jewkes was not afforded an opportunity 1n the 
trial court to suggest types of equitable relief wh1chrn·: 
be granted, Jewkes be! ieves the fol lowing to be poss1hle 
types of relief: (l) a credit against the obligation c;· 
on the property for the $100,000 water well contributed 
Jewkes and other benefits conferred upon the p~operty a· 
expense of Jewkes; or, (2) an order that AID be requirPc 
bid the full fair market value of the property at anv 
Sherrif's sale. 
It is plain that the court can and ought to pruviar 
equitable relief under these circumstances. I t is eer' ·' 
14 
that the drafters of Utah mortgage and trust deed law did 
not contemplate the misuse and abuse of the statute under 
circumstances which would cause so much hardship to the 
party against whom foreclosure is sought, and such great 
possible benefits to the foreclosing party. If matters are 
allowed to stand as decreed in the court below, AID will be 
in a position to purchase the property at Sherriff's sale, 
for whatever sum it may bid (assuming, as is usually the 
case, that no other bidders appear), re-sell the property at 
a substantially higher figure, and then seek a deficiency 
judgement for the unpaid balance of the note against 
Jewkes. This is patently unfair and undesirable. 
15 
I I. THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED IN THIS CASE BEAR ~, 1 , 
RELATION TO THE VALUE Of THE SERVICES RENDERED, ARE 
EXORBITANT AND UNREASONABLE, AND VIOLATE PUBLIC POLu.·; 
In the case below, the judge awarded Plaintiff 
attorney's fees "in the amount of 10% (ten percent) of Pc 
principal amount of the debt, the sum of $26,577.00." \i 
trial, AID's expert testified that his usual fee was lift 
such cases, and that he thought a 10 percent fee was 
reasonable in al 1 foreclosure cases. AID' s president,,,. 
testified that he had agreed to pay counsel a fee of 10%. 
Thus, the attorneys fee award amounts to a holding by the 
court that a 10% fee is a reasonable fee in all mortage 
foreclosure cases. 
In fact, the court stated (transcript, page 29), "\Ir 
McMullin, isn't the law governed by the contract between·. 
attorneys, clients, subject to an objection as to the 
question of its reasonablness?" This is an erroneous 
statement of the law. The agreement between Plaintiff ar 
attorney does not control. Utah Code 78-37-9 provides, 
pertinent part: 
"In all cases of foreclosure, when an attorney's fr' 
is claimed by the Plaintiff, the amount thereof sria 
be fixed by the court, any stipulation to the cont··" 
notwithstanding; provided no other or greater arno 1111 
shall be al lowed or decreed than the swn which >1" 
appear by the evidence to be actually.charge~ by'" 
to be paid to the attorney to the Pla1nt1ff. 
Thus, it is clear that the Court has responsibility to 
reasonable fee which in no case may exceed the amount 
16 
charged by the attorney for the Plaintiff. Therefore, the 
court is incorrect in its characterization of the law as 
awarding the amount agreed upon betwen the Plaintiff and his 
attorney, unless it is proven to be unreasonable. The law 
is just the reverse. The Court is required to fix a 
reasonable attorneys fee, but even if the attorneys fee 
agreed upon between the Plaintiff and his attorney is 
unreasonably low, that is the maximum amount which may be 
charged. 
It is clear that a percentage fee can be rarely be a 
reasonable fee in cases of mortgage foreclosure. If a fixed 
percentage is used, the attorneys fee will be unreasonably 
low in cases involving relatively minor debts (for example, 
$100 in the case of a $1000 mortgage), and will be 
unreasonably high, in the case involving a large debt (for 
example, $1,000,000 in the case of a $10,000,000 
foreclosure). In most cases, the same amount of effort will 
be required, regardless of the size of the mortgage. 
The mount at issue is only one factor to be taken into 
consideration in cases involving attorneys fees. In the 
case of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45, Utah 320, 145p, 1036, 
the court held that it was error for the court to fix a 10% 
attorneys fee in a mortgage foreclosure case, without 
determining whether the fee would be a reasonable one. 
Al so, in the Jensen case, the court noted that a reasonable 
l' 
fee is one which is reasonable under the facts and 
circumstances of each case, which must depend upon the 
amount in controversy and the labor and responsibilitv 
imposed upon the attorney in obtaining judgement. 
An extensive annotation at 57 ARL3d, 475, entitled 
Attorneys Fees in Absence of Pro vision, deals with the 
question of establishing reasonable attorneys fees. Al 
conclusion, of the opening section of this note, after 
extensive discussion, the author surrrnarizes the precedin1 
cases as follows (p. 487): 
It would appear that most, if not all, the factors 
considered by courts in fixing attorney's fees ~Y 
be classified under four general headings, namely, 
(1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, 
training, education, experience, professional 
standing and skill; (2) The character of the work 
to be done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its 
importance, the time and skill required, the respon 
sibility imposed, and the prominence and character 
of the par ti es, where they affect the importance oi 
the litigation; (3) the work actually performed 
by the lawyer: the skill, time, and attention give 
to the work: and (4) the results: whether the 
attorney was successful and what benefits were dert'• 
(citations omitted) 
The author further corrments in the case of reputali 
and skill of counsel, noting at page 486, "the reputatlO' 
counsel will not alone entitle him to a large fee, thee· 
generally holding that an experienced and skilled attornr 
who is performing work requiring little experience or·' 
is not entitled to compensation on the basis of his 
experience and skill." 
With respect to the amount involved, the author n.t 
at page 485, "the amount involved appears to be partier, 
18 
significant in the case of legal services performed for 
e>tates and trusts, and in the case of stockholders 
derivative suits and antitrust actions." Obviously, the 
amount involved has little effect on the value of services 
rendered in a foreclosure case. 
Mr. Ivins, the Plaintiff's expert witness, indicated 
that he was basing his estimate of a reasonable attorneys 
fee on the standard set forth in the American Bar 
Association disciplinary rule 2-106. However, he gave 
almost his entire emphasis to the question of the amount at 
issue. It should be noted that rule 2-106 was not designed 
to determine what a reasonable fee is, but to determine what 
fees would be excessive, and therefore subject to 
discplinary action. The rule is as follows: 
A fee is clearly excessive when after a review of the 
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with 
a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in 
excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered 
as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following: (1) the time and labor 
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly. (2) The likelihood, if 
apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employ-
ment by the lawyer. (3) The fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar legal services. 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances. (6) The nature and length of the 
professional relationship with the client. (7) The 
experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or 
lawyers performing the services. (8) Whether the 
fee is fixed or contingent. 
1 u 
In this case, we have a simple foreclosure matter, 
which is complicated slightly by the requirement of go
11
,; 
trial, the trial lasting under a full day. Trial br 1ef 1 
were not f i 1 ed, and it appears that no large amount 0 r 
effort has been required on the part of Plaintiff's 
attorney. Under these circumstances, the court should 
assess a fee based on the court's experience in jurlg1ng' 
amount of work necessary to accomplish the foreclosure a: 
the rate usually charged by attorneys who are competent· 
handle foreclosure matters in Utah County. 
No evidence was introduced at trial as to the amount 
AID's attorney's effort in the case. When AID's attorne" 
offered himself as a witness, the testimony was not 
received. However, since it is the responsibility of t~1 
attorney for Plaintiff to prove every aspect of his case, 
failure to introduce testimony as to the number of hours 
cannot be used against Jewkes so as to justify an attorne" 
fee award based soley upon the evidence concerning the 
suggested 10% standard. 
In the opinion of counsel for Jewkes, the amount of 
effort in preparing for and trying this case could not 
exceeded 50 hours by any reasaonable standard. Trill", 11 " 
attorneys fee awarded, ( $ 2 6 , 5 7 7 . 0 0 ) wo u l d produce " 
compensation to AID' s attorney of $531. 54 per hour· fhl' 
by any standard for this type of case, would be exce»IV' 
"O 
In an annotation at 58 ALR 3d 201, entitled "Attorneys 
Fees in Real Estate Matters, Section 5, Real Property, 
Mortages, and Deeds of Trust, the author surrmarizes cases 
which have dealt with attorneys fees in mortage and 
foreclosure matters. It should be noted that in no case 
cited was an amount approaching that asserted in this case 
allowed. In fact, in one case, a fee of $27,000 was reduced 
to $2,000, even though the mortgage in question involved 
property valued at $350,000. (see 558 ALR 3d 201 p.216, and 
Lucerne Investment Company v. Estate of Belvedere, Inc. 
4llF 2d 1205 (CA 1969). 
It should also be noted that a fixed percentage fee, in 
all Real Estate cases, would undoubtedly violate a principle 
set forth in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 US# 773 
( 1973). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held 
that it was unlawful for a state bar association to publish 
a suggested list of attorneys fees. The court held that 
attorneys are not a protected class and that the public is 
entitled to the benefit of price competition in the offering 
of attorney's services. This is true, even though attorneys 
are not required to adhere to the published attorneys fee 
schedule. 
If this court were to endorse the holding that a 10% 
fee is a reasonable fee in mortage foreclosure cases, it 
would amount to the publication by the court of a fixed fee 
21 
for this type of case. This would deprive the publtr•,f 
benefit of price competiton for attorneys services in 1,, 
foreclosure of mortgages, and would violate the sp1ri1. 
not the letter, of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. 
On the basis of the preceding, it is clear that the 
court below has ordered an excessive attorneys fee, and 
this case must be returned to the court below for the 
determination of a resaonable attorneys fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. Hal Visick 
Attorney for Appellant 
')'' 
